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Abstract 
As changes in the US health care system continue to evolve and change, maintaining the financial viability of 
hospitals is crucial to the system’s operation. Two lines of inquiry have been pursued in describing factors affecting 
financial viability. The first line of inquiry relates to the external payer mix of patients focusing on patients who are 
unable to compensate hospitals for the care received. The second line of inquiry focuses on internal management 
and because hospitals do not typically answer to shareholders, managers become lax and X-inefficiency may arise. 
In this paper, we assess both these lines of research in order to determine if payment source by patients and/or 
managerial  efficiency  contributes  to  higher  total  net  revenue.  By  using  a  weighted  DEA  we  measured  the 
inefficiency of inputs to the production process on our sample of 144 hospitals operating in Florida during 2005. We 
used the derived inefficient use of inputs along with the  number of days by payer group (Medicare, Medicaid, 
private insurance, other public insurance, and uncompensated care) in order to explain their effects on total net 
revenue. To preview our results, we found that the inefficient use of beds and the provision of care to patients who 
are considered as uncompensated care reduce significantly total net revenue while private pay patients and patients 
covered by other public insurance add to total net revenue. These findings add to the literature by showing that it is 
patient payer mix and managerial inefficiency together affect hospital financial viability. We also demonstrate how 
our findings contribute to current policy debates both on the federal US and the state of Florida level. 
 
Keywords: Hospital; Net Revenue; Efficiency; Payer; Uncompensated Care. 
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How Does Payer Mix and Technical Inefficiency Affect Hospital Net Revenue? 
 
1. Introduction 
Health policy focuses on the issues of access, quality, and cost containment, particularly as it applies to 
hospitals. Since the 1980’s, access to hospital care for the uninsured has been discussed and was the 
impetus for health care reform proposals in the 1990’s under President Clinton and more recently The 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) of 2010 passed and signed by President Obama. As 
laudable as the proposed expansion of health insurance coverage is, other issues remain. Some raise the 
issue that a significant number of uninsured will remain. For example, Katz et al. (2010) have estimated 
that 23 million will remain uninsured even under PPACA and if disproportionate share (DSH) is reduced 
as proposed under PPACA, hospital viability may be threatened, which could curtail access to hospitals if 
some, especially serving vulnerable populations have to close. In order to ascertain the potential impact 
of these possible outcomes, there are two basic lines of inquiry regarding hospital economic viability.  
 
One line of research reports that challenges to hospital economic wellbeing is the proportion of care 
hospitals provide to the poor and uninsured. Feder, Hadley, and Mullner (1984) argue that hospital 
financial status and care to the poor are closely connected. Re-organization of hospitals in response to 
market pressures have been examined and research results have pointed to a reduction of care for the 
poor as the proportion of for profit hospitals in the US increases (Thorpe and Seiber, 2000). Even before 
the recent recession, $28.8 billion of uncompensated care was provided in 2006 with this burden falling 
on some hospitals more than others (Katz, et al. 2010). Because of the social responsibility hospitals face, 
even uninsured patients can not be turned away when in need as codified in law by the Emergency 
Medical  Treatment  and  Active  Labor  Act  (EMTALA,  1986).  Therefore,  the  treatment  for  the  poor, 
uninsured, and underinsured is exogenous to hospital decision makers. The only discretionary choice 
hospital decision makers do have in reducing the number of uninsured patients is to limit services. 
 
Historically, hospitals were able to cross-subsidize uncompensated care by average cost pricing and 
receiving  higher  reimbursements  from  insured  patients.  This  strategy  was  greatly  reduced  with  the 
introduction of the prospective payment system implemented by Medicare, and contracts with private 
payers to exchange lower fees for increased patient bases. With increasing cost consciousness among 
third party payers, the burden of uncompensated care was absorbed by hospitals which in turn would 
threaten financial viability.  
 
Friedman et al. (2004) examined hospital profitability, defined as net revenue and payer groups and 
found positive relationships among Medicare, Medicaid, and privately insured payers. These authors 
found that Medicare covered patients added the most to hospital profitability followed by privately 
insured, Medicaid, and self insured. Mukamel et al. (2002) also tied hospital financial viability to the 
amount of bad debt and charity care provided. Adding to the literature on payment source and hospital 
profitability, these authors however did not explicitly focus on internal efficiency. 
 
A second line of inquiry has been on inefficiencies arising in hospitals including ownership organization, 
regulation, principal-agency, and third party payers (Eakin, 1991; Puig-Junoy, 2000). A unique feature of 
the US hospital system is multiple ownership forms. A majority of community hospitals operating in the 
US are not-for-profit (approximately 58% followed by government public hospitals (22%) and for-profit 
(20%)  (American  Hospital  Association,  2009).  Because  of  these  various  ownership  forms,  hospitals 
pursue different objectives other than profit maximization or cost minimization. Given varying ownership 
forms and differing objectives, there is a chance of X-inefficiency arising. X-inefficiency as described by 
Liebenstein  (1966)  hypothesized  that  without  strict  economic  objectives,  managers  may  be  lax  in IESEG Working Paper Series 2012-ECO-01 
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ensuring cost minimization or profit maximization is achieved. In the case of hospitals, there is the 
pursuit of other objectives include optimizing quality and quantity, providing social goods (i.e., teaching), 
maintaining  safety  net  features  (care  for  the  poor,  uninsured,  and  underinsured),  offering  highly 
technical and expensive services such as burn units, trauma center, and neo-natal care, and paying 
shareholders Other factors associated with cost variability among hospitals include, the maintenance of 
excess capacity in case of emergency (Joskow, 1980); the widely reported non-price competition in terms 
of  duplication  of  highly  technological  services  (Sloan,  2000);  regulations  requiring  staffing  ratios, 
(Coffman,  et  al.,  2002;  Cox,  et  al.,  2005);  and  case  mix  of  patients  (Rosko  and  Chilingerian,  1999; 
Vitaliano, 1987). Given the stochastic demand for hospital services and the other private and social 
objectives hospitals are to meet (for example the provision of charity care), traditional economic models 
for  either  of  these  objectives  are  complicated.  Because  of  the  competing  demands  on  hospitals  to 
provide private as well as social goods, objectives such as cost minimization or profit maximization are 
not strictly pursued, therefore, theoretical cost (profit) functions are not appropriate. Because of the 
limits to more traditional economic modeling of hospital economic behavior, literature using alternative 
modeling techniques has been employed to measure hospital productivity and efficiency.  
 
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is one such approach. Flexible in its structure, this method has been 
used to determine the use of inputs to produce outputs and from this, define production frontiers, 
wherein deviation from these frontiers measures inefficiency. Hollingsworth, (2003, 2008) provides a 
comprehensive review of this literature. Focusing on the DEA literature, it is argued that minimizing 
input use to produce a given level of output, the definition of input-based efficiency, is a necessary 
condition  for  minimizing  costs.  Conversely,  maximizing  the  number  of  outputs  (number  of  patients 
treated) is necessary for maximizing revenues. Another benefit of the DEA approach is that the resulting 
efficiency findings are relative rather than absolute in the engineering sense. Therefore no unrealistic 
objectives  are  imposed  on  the  hospitals  and  measuring  performance  against  peer  groups  permits 
reasonable assumption regarding improving efficiency. 
 
The two threads of inquiry used here combine how patient payer mix including care for the poor (either 
via  Medicaid or  uncompensated  care)  and  how  internal  hospital  inefficiencies  may  affect  economic 
viability. In other words, both the external environment and the performance of the hospitals within 
these environments will affect how well hospitals maintain their economic well-being (Cody, Friss, and 
Hawkinson, 1995). By using the payer mix we include a de facto measure of allocative efficiency and by 
using the inefficient number of inputs we include a measure of technical efficiency, and therefore we 
completely describe the economic definition in assessing the differences in net revenue. By using the 
concept  of  net  revenue  rather  than  accounting  measures  such  as  operating  margins  we  maintain 
consistency with the economic component in measuring efficiency. Using this definition of the economic 
outcome also can be readily applicable to managerial and policy decision making since the marginal 
effects of each payer group and use of inputs can be parlayed into a monetary interpretation. 
In the next section of the paper, we describe our methodological approaches. We provide the data 
source and descriptive statistics in section 3. Results are presented in section 4 followed by discussion in 
section 5. 
 
2. Methods  
A. Measuring Technical Efficiency 
As Hadley et al. (1994) note, “the heart of the theoretical problem is that the objective function is usually 
unobservable”. In light of the difficulty of specifying the objective function, it is similarly difficult to 
specify  a  functional  form  since  this  may  lead  to  specification  error.  Since  we  are  working  with  a 
theoretical premise that hospitals do not cost-minimize, we opt to use the nonparametric DEA frontier IESEG Working Paper Series 2012-ECO-01 
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for three main reasons. First, by virtue of the DEA approach, no a priori assumption of cost-minimization 
(profit maximization) needs to be incorporated into the model. Second, DEA only requires information 
on  input  and  output  quantities.  No  price  information  is  needed  which  is  a major  advantage  in  the 
hospital sector. Third, DEA uses a multiple input and multiple output framework, which is relevant to 
hospitals  that  produce  many  different  services  using  many  types  of  labor  and  capital.  Traditional 
production function relies on a single output or requires price and behavior assumption in order to 
derive the cost function in a multiple output context. 
 
DEA  has  been  widely  used  in  ascertaining  technical  efficiency,  scale  efficiency,  and  congestion.  To 
review, technical efficiency measures the amount of inputs required to produce a given level of outputs. 
In order to derive technical efficiency, we follow the methods described by Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell 
(1994) and expanded by Färe, and Lovell (1978) which is derived from the original work by Farrell (1957) 
and  Debreu’s  (1951)  definition  of  productive  efficiency.  The  approach  we  use  in  this  paper  is  an 
extension of traditional DEA as we use the weighted DEA à la Färe and Lovell where the weights are 
defined as the share of the input cost  into total cost. In fact, using the weights as defined here is 
equivalent to the weights used in a Törnqvist productivity index.  
 
Since DEA is a non-parametric approach, we present the linear programming problems to be solved in 
order to determine overall technical efficiency. We employ the variable returns to scale technology to 
permit more peer groupings without having to rely on scalar expansions or contractions as in the case of 
constant returns to scale. Variable returns to scale relate to a short term horizon which is in line with the 
operational net revenue we used in the second step of our analysis. 
We use the Färe and Lovell (1978) weighted DEA to derive the technical efficiency measures by solving 
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We note that rather than applying the same radial contraction score (λ) to measure the inefficient use of 
each input, we use different λ for each input and we use the share of each input cost into total cost as 
their weights in the objective function . In this way we measure the extent to which each input is 
inefficiently used. These measures we will use in the second step regression are given at the optimal 
value of (1) by 
*
, , n j n xn   .  
 
B. Regression Approach 
Following the suggestion by Hollingworth (2008), we apply multiple techniques. Whereas it may be 
relevant for hospital managers and policy makers to be interested in the determination of technical IESEG Working Paper Series 2012-ECO-01 
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efficiency for each hospital in our sample, it does not answer the direct question of how both patient 
payment mix (which may be partially exogenous) and managerial decisions on how best to employ 
hospital resources can be combined to determine independent effects on each hospital’s net revenue. 
To accomplish this we use the technical inefficient number of beds, physicians, and nurses used for 
patient care as well as patient inpatient days by payer group as regressors in determining variability 
among hospitals’ net revenue. This is accomplished using ordinary least squares multiple regression. It is 
important to use multiple regression since we wish to identify independent effects of each variable on 




pm pm n n n
pm n
TNR x x               (2) 
where TNR is the Total Net Revenue (in $),  pm x  is the number of patients of each type of payers, 
*
nn x   is 
the inefficiency of each input and   is a residual term. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Three separate data sets were merged in order to perform this study. Limiting our sample to general, 
short  term  hospitals  we  use  The  Florida  Agency  for  Health  Care  Administration  (data  on  hospital 
capacity), Hospital Inpatient Discharge Data (patient characteristics) and the Hospital Financial Data for 
Florida for specific service capabilities. Case mix data for the hospitals comes from Solucient and is based 
on DRG pairs derived from Medicare data. Reliance on Medicare data should not be a problem even 
though our discharges cover all payers since it has been found that the Medicare case-mix index is highly 
correlated with other hospital case mix indices (Jensen and Morrisey, 1985). These specific case mix 
indices from Solucient have also been used in previous studies  including Clement et al. (2008) and 
Valdmanis, Rosko, and Mutter (2008). Because hospitals treat a variety of patients with varying levels of 
disease/illness  severity  it is  necessary  to  adjust  hospital  efficiency  to  account  for these  differences. 
Otherwise, there may be an upward bias of technical inefficiency without considering that higher case 
mix patients require more resources to treat them effectively. Since we have limited information, we 
derived  the  number  of  outpatient  visits  as  a  measure  of  inpatient  discharges  using  the  formula  of 
adjusted outpatient equals gross outpatient revenue divided by inpatient gross revenue per inpatient 
day (www.whainfocenter.com, 2010). 
 
The first step in our analysis is the DEA model in order to determine technical efficiency. For inputs we 
use the number of staffed and licensed beds, the number of full time equivalence (FTE) physicians, the 
number of FTE nurses, the number of FTE other personnel and the number of inpatient days. We include 
the number of inpatient days as an input since in order to produce patient discharges we need an input 
to represent the amount of treatment during a patient stay. We also argue that inpatient days can be 
seen as substitutes for the other more familiar inputs. For example, with fewer nurses, patients would 
have an increased length of stay rather than a more intense care that would be possible with more 
nurses that would result in fewer inpatient days. 
For outputs, we used the total number of inpatient discharges, outpatient equivalent days and the case 
mix index per hospital. We use inpatient discharges as output because we consider hospital activity as 
exogenous with the objective of minimizing inputs given a level of activity. We argue that the number of 
inpatient days is under the control of the hospital and endogenous. That is why it is used as an input. We 
use case mix as a separate output to better categorize hospitals by peer groups based on the severity of 
patient care provided which is directly tied to resource use. The inputs and outputs used for this analysis 
are given in Table 1. 
 IESEG Working Paper Series 2012-ECO-01 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Determining Technical Efficiency. N=144. 
Variable  Mean  St. Deviation 
INPUTS     
Inpatient days  75,480  76,448 
Beds  348  306 
Physicians in direct patient care  292  305 
Nurses in direct patient care  375  442 
Other Personnel  850  1,137 
OUTPUTS     
Total Inpatient Discharges  18,017  15,454 
Case-Mix  1.40  0.23 
Outpatient in estimated days  34,821  31,510 
FINDING FROM DEA ANALYSIS     
Technical Efficiency Measure for Physicians in direct patient care  0.75  0.27 
Technical Efficiency Measure for Nurses in direct patient care  0.85  0.15 
Technical Efficiency Measure for Other Personnel  0.83  0.20 
Technical Efficiency Measure for Inpatient days  0.86  0.15 
Technical Efficiency Measure for Beds  0.82  0.21 
 
Our  sample  consists  of  144  hospitals  operating  in  Florida  during  2005  which  represents  60%  of  all 
hospitals in Florida (238). There is a wide variability in the outputs and inputs in our sample but we find 
relatively similar inefficiency scores ranging from 0.75 to 0.86. For example, this finding is interpreted as 
(1-0.75)  equaling  25%  is  the  amount  hospitals  could  reduce  physicians  (MDs)  and  maintain  the 
production of outputs. Further, since technical efficiency is a necessary condition for cost reduction, 
hospitals in turn could reduce costs which should improve financial viability. 
 
As stated above, we are also interested in ascertaining the payer mix of patients’ affect of variation in 
net revenues. Patients are characterized by payment group as reported on the data set. Uncompensated 
care equals charity care plus bad debt since it is often difficult to differentiate between the two. Other 
public insurance includes CHAMPUS (the military health group payment) plus other public insurance 
from the State of Florida. These descriptive statistics are given in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Regression Model Variables. N=144. 
Variable  Mean  St. Deviation 
Net Revenues ($)  3,884,841  28,023,716 
Medicare Days  45,795  40,453 
Medicaid Days  4,094  10,179 
Private Insurance  18,350  23,328 
Other Public Insurance  1,898  2,983 
Uncompensated Care  5,344  14,662 
Inefficient number of Inpatient days  10,445  13,956 
Inefficient number of Beds  62  88 
Inefficient number of Physicians in direct patient care  78  119 
Inefficient number of Nurses in direct patient care  53  76 
Inefficient number of Other Personnel  148  243 
 IESEG Working Paper Series 2012-ECO-01 
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Again, we find a wide variation in terms of net revenues, as well as the number of inpatient days by 
payer groups and differences in the inefficient number of inputs. 
 
4. Results 
Positive  net  revenue  is  integral  for  hospitals  maintaining  financial  viability  in  the  continuance  of 
providing hospital care access to their communities. We use multiple regression techniques in order to 
ascertain the independent effect of each of the explanatory variables on the variation of net revenue. 
We chose the multiple regression ordinary least squares approach for a straightforward interpretation of 
the independent variables affect on variations on net revenue. The findings from our regression results 
are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Regression Results 
Dependent Variable Net revenue= Total Revenues-Total Expenses. N=144. 
Variable  Coefficient  t-test  Pr < 
Intercept  648,074  0.35  0.73 
Number of Medicare Inpatient Days  7  0.21  0.91 
Number of Medicaid Inpatient Days  331  -0.95  0.35 
Number of Private Insurance Inpatient Days  525  5.19  0.0001 
Number of Other Public Insurance Inpatient Days   1,007  2.07  0.04 
Number of Uncompensated Care Inpatient Days   -1,616  -6.90  0.0001 
Inefficient number of Inpatient days  281  0.83  0.41 
Inefficient number of Beds  -47,206  -2.48  0.01 
Inefficient number of Physicians in direct patient care  3,171  0.31  0.76 
Inefficient number of Nurses in direct patient care  69,487  0.88  0.38 
Inefficient number of Other Personnel  -17,453  -1.61  0.11 
 




The results we provide in Table 3 demonstrate that hospitals can increase net revenue by increasing the 
share of patients covered  by private insurance and by other public insurance. There is no statistically 
significant effect of increasing Medicare or Medicaid, patients share towards increasing net revenue. We 
also find that treating uncompensa ted care reduces hospitals’ net revenue by $ 1,616 per day. The 
inefficient use of hospital beds results in the loss of $47,206 per bed annually. There is no statistically 
significant effect of the inefficient use of the number of nurses on hospital net revenues. From these 
findings, there is no evidence that payer mix as defined for this sample of Florida hospitals is detrimental 
for earning net revenue except in the case of providing hospital care to individuals who are considered as 
uncompensated care per day and it appears from the regression results that it is difficult to cover these 
costs  per  day  by  private  or  other  public  payment.  In  the  case  of  organizational  effects,  hospital 
managers,  could  however,  increase  financial  performance  by  reducing  the  number  of  excess  beds, 
ceteris paribus.  
 
5. Discussion  
The objective of this paper is to assess both hospital patient payer mix and technical efficiency in order 
to ascertain variations in net revenue which is crucial in maintaining economic/financial viability. Using 
the weighted DEA approach, we find that on average, hospitals could reduce excess costs by 18% (the 
average of the individual inputs’ score) by increasing technical efficiency of the inputs used. From the IESEG Working Paper Series 2012-ECO-01 
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regression results this decrease in costs and subsequent increase in net revenue would be realized by 
reducing the number of inefficiently used beds. This finding is consistent with Joskow’s (1980) theory of 
reservation quality. If hospitals wish to pursue this objective in terms of employing inefficient beds, they 
will have to incur higher costs and lower net revenue. It should also be noted that using this Florida data 
set, Leleu et al., (2011) also found that hospitals had an excess number of beds leading to economic 
inefficiencies. Since the best practice frontier derived from the DEA is based on the observations in the 
sample and is relative rather than absolute, hospitals can in essence learn from their peers how best to 
reduce the number of inefficient beds while maintaining patient care.  
 
From the payer variables, hospitals could increase net revenue by providing care to private pay patients 
and other publicly insured patients. There is no impact on net revenue for hospitals providing inpatient 
day care to Medicare, or Medicaid indicating there is no over financial profiting for hospitals via the 
public  sector.  We  did  find  a  statistically  significant  impact  on  net  revenue  in  the  treatment  of 
uncompensated care patients which corroborates earlier studies such as Friedman et al. (2004). From 
our findings, the increased pressure on Medicare (via prospective payment) and more cost control on 
the part of private insurers, the past practice of cross-subsidization is not even a possibility for hospitals 
which primarily serve this population. 
 
Because the provision of uncompensated care may be considered a social good that relies on public 
intervention, government budget allocations and subsidies such as disproportionate share hospital (DSH) 
payments mitigate the financial hardship on these hospitals as these subsidies increase income margins 
for hospitals providing uncompensated care by 2.4% (Agency of Health Care Research and Quality, 2003). 
In  terms  of  policy,  the  number  of  insured  Americans  as  proposed  by  the  Patient  Protection  and 
Affordable Care Act is projected to increase; therefore, DSH payments will be cut under the theory that 
an increased private pay patient load would negate its need.  
 
As a consequence of proposed reductions to DSH, access to hospitals by the poor may still be difficult 
since  Katz  et  al.  (2010)  predicts  that  23  million  individuals  will  still  be  uninsured  which  would  still 
challenge financial viability especially for safety net hospitals. Eliminating DSH payments to our sample 
hospitals could also result in a greater negative impact threatening financial viability. Officials at the 
Florida Hospital Association are also concerned that if disproportionate share hospital payments are 
reduced to Florida hospitals as they may be more prone to financial distress than hospitals operating in 
other states due to the high uninsured and illegal immigrant populations (Florida Hospital Association, 
2009).  
 
More recently, the Governor (Richard Scott, R) submitted a budget drastically cutting Medicaid payments 
(Kennedy, 2011) because he attributed inefficient and costly use of inputs were attributed to Medicaid 
payments made to Florida hospitals. Given that in our net revenue equation Medicaid patients did not 
have a statistically significant effect on net revenue and it does not appear that Medicaid payments leads 
to  higher  technically  inefficient  inputs.  Therefore,  our  research  does  not  support  the  Governor’s 
contention that Medicaid payments to hospitals lead to non-optimal behavior on the part of managers. 
Nurses in California are also threatening to strike due to budget cuts (Bernstein, 2011). 
 
On a related policy note, we did not find any statistically significant effect of nurses on net revenue 
which suggests that they are possibly not being used to increase net revenue. However, we did find a 
positive relationship between inefficient nurses and net revenue. Since our finding on inefficient number 
of nurses does not negatively effect net revenue we contend that these results do not contradict earlier 
research indicating that employing more nurses leads to higher quality of care (Valdmanis, et al., 2008; IESEG Working Paper Series 2012-ECO-01 
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Aiken, et al. 2002). The role of registered nurses could increase net revenue as hospitals compete for 
more paying patients on the basis of quality. Other research has reported that the more nurses hired by 
hospitals lead to less rehospitalizations which is directly tied to the policy of pay for performance in 
which reimbursements are directly tied to patient outcomes. New regulations from Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services will not reimburse hospitals for rehospitalization of patients within 30 days of 
discharge. Jencks et al., (2009) reported of a high number of rehospitalizations, indicates that more 
rather than fewer nurses should be pursued. Our findings strongly suggest that utilizing nurses efficiently 
may also enhance the hospital’s financial viability. Further, focusing budget cuts in state funding and the 
consequence of reducing the number of nurses does not appear to be a wise policy to pursue. 
 
The findings we present here rely on data provided by the various data sources. As such, the usual 
caveats apply. First, hospitals may not be consistent in the reporting in FTE nurses. The number reported 
are given as an annual figure which may include nurses hired for peak time periods (which is possible 
given the transient population in Florida particularly in the winter) and some FTE nurses may be hired in 
other  capacities  such  as  administration.  Better  accounting  and  specific  data  collection  should  be 
forthcoming given the increased reliance on data for the new health care reform policy. Second, the 
entire of population of hospitals were not included in this study due to missing values, therefore, the 
findings are based on 60% of hospitals operating in Florida during 2005. Again, more patient-based data 
or revenue per payment group would better elucidate the exact relationship between payer group and 
hospital  net  revenue.  Despite  these  data  shortcomings,  the  approach  we  introduce  here  will  be  of 
increased value as hospital and health care costs continue to garner policy importance and better and 
more generalizable data will become available. 
 
This research is preliminary and should be updated to account for the recent economic recession that 
may  have  serious  consequences  as  more  individuals  become  uninsured  and  postpone  necessary 
management of illnesses that leads to more hospitalizations with reduced reimbursements. State budget 
cuts,  as  it  affects  Medicaid  coverage  will  also  impact  hospitals  particularly  those  already  caring  for 
vulnerable populations.  
 
Our work expands on previous works on hospital financial viability since we also incorporate measures of 
the technically inefficient use of inputs that hospital managers could address to maintain positive net 
revenue.  Therefore, we  posit that  this  two  pronged  approach  –  reimbursements  from  patients  and 
hospital management – should also be evaluated as health reform changes are implemented to address 
access to, cost containment for, and financial viability of hospitals.  
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